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NOTES
ONE FEDERALISM AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE:
ENFORCING THE LIMITS OF ARTICLE I
Alexa R. Baltes*
INTRODUCTION
Federalism has been at the heart of our political system since the time of
the Founding. Reinvigorated by Herbert Wechsler’s 1954 article on the political safeguards of federalism,1 and by the rise of “New Federalism” in the late
twentieth century, the federalism debate has ceaselessly perplexed the legal
community. Scholars disagree about the safeguards of federalism, the purpose of federalism, and the continuing legitimacy of the federal structure.
Focusing on the history, text, and structure of the Constitution, this Note
seeks to advance that debate by engaging two points made by a prominent
scholar in the field regarding the safeguards of federalism.
First, Heather Gerken’s recent suggestion that scholars on both sides of
the political safeguards of federalism versus judicial review debate should
give up the fight2 threatens clarity going forward and lacks historical, constitutional foundation. Professor Gerken’s sensitivity to the realities of our
complex federal structure sharpens debate regarding the proper approach to
federalism today.3 It is certainly true that the relationship between the federal government and the states has changed since 1789, and modern theories
of federalism must be able to engage the world we inhabit. But the complexity of our system does not negate the need “to adopt one theory to rule them
all.”4 While she is right to point out the “both/and” nature of federalism
protection5—that is, both procedural safeguards and judicial review have a
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2017; Bachelor of Arts in
English Literature and Political Science, Illinois Wesleyan University, 2014. I thank
Professor A.J. Bellia for his helpful suggestions throughout the writing process. I also
thank the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for their revisions. All errors are my own.
1 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
2 See Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549 (2012).
3 See generally id.
4 Id. at 1552.
5 Id. at 1551 (emphasizing the role of cooperative federalism throughout the article).
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role in maintaining our constitutionally conceived dual system of government—it does not follow that there are “many federalisms”6 or that a unifying theory for maintaining and protecting the proper balance of our federal
structure is somehow unnecessary. The constitutionally designed federalism
structure still provides the roles and mechanisms for maintaining that delicate balance of power—even if the balance, rightfully, looks different today
than it did in the past. Debates about the proper safeguards of federalism
may be “tired,”7 but their persistence is a testament to their importance. A
unified theory of federalism, offered by the framers and entrenched in the
text of the Constitution, must prevail over an “analy[sis] [of] which flavor of
federalism best fits a given context.”8
Second, because she does not ground her theory of federalism primarily
in the text of the Constitution, Professor Gerken’s later work distorts the
analysis required from the Court on federalism questions. Evaluating the two
main approaches the Court has taken, Professor Gerken notes: “Some of the
Court’s decisions define federal power in relation to the states, and others
define it in isolation.”9 She finds the former, relational approach better
(though not ideal) because it is more manageable and durable, and because
it comes closer to recognizing the reality that “states and the federal government regulate shoulder-to-shoulder in the same, tight policymaking space.”10
Professor Gerken’s insightful analysis illuminates a need for a cogent, principled approach to federalism questions that forces judges to conform to “a
mediating theory for translating abstract principles into concrete doctrine”11
instead of getting caught up in the “tangled underbrush of lawyers’ tricks and
logicians’ games.”12 Her concerns force more precise thinking about the
Court’s role in this area. Nevertheless, she ultimately inverts the analysis by
suggesting it is better for the Court to frame the limits imposed on the federal government in terms of state sovereignty rather than constitutional limits
on federal power.13
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 1552; see also id. at 1550–51 (“When scholars write about these debates, they
often write as if we must choose between these different accounts of federalism—that we
need one theory to rule them all . . . . We need not hew exclusively to one vision of federalism. We can choose all of them at once. . . . It would be useful if federalism debates were
more attentive to the fact that there are many federalisms, not one.”).
9 Heather K. Gerken, Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85, 95 (2014).
10 Id. at 87, 95.
11 Id. at 100.
12 Id. at 86; see also id. at 99, 104.
13 Id. at 86 (asserting that the Court is right to “mark where Congress’s power ends by
identifying where state power begins, using sovereignty as a touchstone”). Though she
ultimately dismisses the Court’s analysis in these cases as “wrongheaded and out of date,”
Gerken believes it is nonetheless appropriate to “retain the central insight of the sovereignty cases—that federal power must be defined in relation to the states.” Id. at 113–14.
Such a framework, she claims, “generate[s] doctrine that is more manageable, more comprehensible, and therefore more likely to endure.” Id. at 86.
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This stands in tension with the Constitution’s text: the Court’s role in
safeguarding federalism is to enforce the constitutional limits of federal
power. The Constitution gives the Court no power to leverage state sovereignty as such, but it offers a clear directive for the judiciary to check congressional overreach.14 This means, properly construed, limited federal
government is a means to a split sovereignty (and thus, state sovereignty)
end. Thus, Professor Gerken is misguided in her criticism that “limiting the
federal government’s power” is a “limit[ ] for limits’ sake.”15 State sovereignty, in and of itself, is an end worth pursuing and one protected by the
Constitution. This Note maintains that a judicial role focused on enforcing
the limits of federal power provides the cogent, durable framework for analyzing federalism questions that Professor Gerken rightly demands.
Part I of this Note offers a brief account of the two main theories of
federalism protection: the political safeguards (or process federalism) and
judicial review. Part II then suggests a dual-safeguards approach as the single
constitutionally grounded theory, and proceeds to situate the procedural
safeguards and, importantly, judicial review, in the history, text, and structure
of the Constitution. Next, delving into the Court’s New Federalism line of
decisions, Part III analyzes the implications for these two constitutionally
grounded safeguards to deduce the proper framework for their respective
applications. It suggests that while political safeguards may be conceived in
terms of state sovereignty, the Court should frame its analysis in terms of
constitutional limits on federal power. Furthermore, Part III demonstrates
that judicially imposed limits on constitutionally enumerated powers offer a
workable, and desirable, framework in practice. Part IV then explains why
such a framework matters and defends state sovereignty as an end worthy of
it all.
I.
A.

REHASHING

THE

TIRED DEBATE

The Political Safeguards of Federalism

In his 1954 article on the “Political Safeguards of Federalism,” Herbert
Wechsler argues that there is no need for judicial protection of state sovereignty because the Constitution equips the states to protect their own institutional prerogatives via the political process.16 Wechsler emphasizes the
“crucial role [played by the states] in the selection and the composition of
14 See infra Parts II, III.
15 Gerken, supra note 9, at 111 (criticizing “NFIB and its doctrinal traveling companions” for “allow[ing] means to bleed into ends”); see also id. (claiming that there is no
difference “between the means (limiting the federal government’s power) and ends (a
limited federal government)”).
16 See Wechsler, supra note 1; see also id. at 544 (noting that specific procedural provisions that serve to protect state interest add to the protections inherent in “the sheer existence of the states and their political power to influence the action of the national
authority”).
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the national authority”17 in each of the three policy-making bodies of the
federal government. First, he points to the Senate and finds it “cannot fail to
function as the guardian of state interests as such.”18 Equal representation of
states in the Senate, combined with the filibuster rule and the individual
authority of senators, serves to protect state interests against the potential
oppression of a national majority.19 Turning to the House, Wechsler finds
state interests are protected in that body as well—“though the incidence is
less severe.”20 Here, he suggests that the states are protected by “[their] control of voters’ qualifications, on the one hand, and of districting, on the
other.”21 Lastly, Wechsler claims that state interests are also protected via the
President:
[B]oth the mode of his selection and the future of his party require that he
also be responsive to local values that have large support within the states.
And since his programs must, in any case, achieve support in Congress—in
so far as they involve new action—he must surmount the greater local sensitivity of Congress before anything is done.22

While the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence after 1937 seemed to have
already embraced Wechsler’s vision of a minor (even nonexistent) judicial
role in protecting state sovereignty,23 his theory was “significant because it
provided a theoretical justification” for the Court’s new minimalist
approach.24 Indeed, the Court later cited Wechsler’s theory to validate its
decision to defer to a congressionally defined balance of power between the
federal government and the states.25 Moreover, even as the Court began to
17 Id. at 546.
18 Id. at 548 (“[T]he composition of the Senate is intrinsically calculated to prevent
intrusion from the center on subjects that dominant state interests wish preserved for state
control.”).
19 Id.; see also Bradford R. Clark, The Procedural Safeguards of Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1681, 1681 (2008) (“Not coincidentally, the Constitution prescribes precise procedures to govern the adoption of each [federal] law, and all of these procedures specifically
require the participation of the Senate or the states.”).
20 Wechsler, supra note 1, at 548–52.
21 Id. at 548, 550 (meaning that a state-defined electorate chooses the state’s representatives and that “the delineation of the districts rests entirely with the states”).
22 Id. at 558.
23 Wechsler did not altogether reject judicial review of potential congressional overreach; instead, he argued that the Court was on its “weakest ground” when interfering on
the behalf of states. Id. at 559. Importantly, he perceived “[t]he prime function envisaged
for judicial review—in relation to federalism—[as] the maintainance of national
supremacy against nullification or usurpation by the individual states.” Id.
24 John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1315
(1997).
25 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550–51 (1985)
(“[T]he principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the
federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself. It is no novelty to
observe that the composition of the Federal Government was designed in large part to
protect the States from overreaching by Congress.”).
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rediscover its voice in federalism issues, the political safeguards justification
became a staple component of a perpetual multi-Justice dissent.26
Wechsler’s theory is active in contemporary legal scholarship as well.
Expanding and modifying the theory in their own ways, Jesse Choper and
Larry Kramer established themselves as two of the most prominent defenders
of the political safeguards camp. For Choper, Wechsler’s theory is part of a
bigger philosophy, which conceives no role for the Court in federalism questions: “[T]he constitutional issue of whether federal action is beyond the
authority of the central government and thus violates ‘states’ rights’ should
be treated as nonjusticiable, final resolution being relegated to the political
branches—i.e., Congress and the President.”27 Instead of inserting itself in
an area adequately protected in the political process, Choper thinks the
Court should save its judicial capital for the protection of individual rights.28
Finally, without conceding the point, Choper suggests that even if the Framers intended judicial review of federalism questions, it is simply unnecessary
in our present political system.29
Taking a yet more evolved approach to political safeguards, Larry
Kramer focuses on the protections offered by substantive politics, rather than
those inherent in political procedure.30 In fact, Kramer is highly critical of
Wechsler’s theory. As he sees it, the procedural safeguards so important to
Wechsler either (1) miss the mark by protecting state interests rather than
autonomy,31 or (2) are completely ineffective.32 Focused on “protecting the
integrity and authority of state political institutions,” Kramer turns to the
“real ‘political safeguards’ of federalism”—party politics.33 Because political
parties transcend every level of government, our political culture “promotes
relationships and establishes obligations among officials that cut across gov-

26 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 183 & n.66 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Wechsler, supra note 1); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
647 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (raising a “political safeguards” objection to the majority’s analysis); id. at 660–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 957 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same).
27 JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 175 (1980).
28 Id. at 59, 123, 169–70.
29 Id. at 242.
30 See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000).
31 Id. at 222 (explaining that federalism is not about “ensuring that national
lawmakers are responsive to [state] interests” and finding instead that “federalism is meant
to preserve the regulatory authority of state and local institutions to legislate policy
choices”).
32 For example, with respect to the states’ ability to limit the electorate, Kramer
explains that “[i]t is, in fact, impossible to think of anything a state could do to protect
itself with this power today that would not be either unlawful or ineffective.” Id. at 226.
33 Id. at 226, 278.
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ernmental planes.”34 In turn, this “mutual dependency” protects the influence of state voices in federal laws more than merely their interests.35
Though fractured over the details, advocates in the political safeguards
camp share two unifying principles. First, the political process sufficiently
protects states from congressional overreach and preserves the federal structure. Second, the Court has no (or very little) role to play in protecting states
from congressional overreach.
B.

Judicial Review

On the other side, proponents of judicially protected federalism are not
willing to wager the permanence of our constitutionally crafted federal structure on the ability of Congress to check itself.36 Furthermore, this side suggests that the framers were likewise unwilling to risk it all on unreliable
political safeguards. While the political safeguards are an undeniable first
line of defense, it is illogical—indeed, “ahistorical”37—to suggest that they
are the only line of defense against the erosion of the central feature of the
American system.
Thus, by necessity and by constitutional design, “federal courts have a
role to play in safeguarding state sovereignty that is . . . legitimate and essential.”38 Even when sovereignty is inefficient for a state, it is no less essential to
the preservation of our federal structure. Viewed in this light, judicial review
“provides an important check on the temptation to surrender state sovereignty voluntarily.”39 Furthermore, and most intuitively, there is no textual
exception to judicial review for federalism cases—if the Court does not have
the power of judicial review, it does not have the power to do its job.40
34
35
36

Id. at 279.
Id.
Justice Kennedy has expressed this same sentiment:
[I]t would be mistaken and mischievous for the political branches to forget that
the sworn obligation to preserve and protect the Constitution in maintaining the
federal balance is their own in the first and primary instance. . . . The political
branches of the Government must fulfill this grave constitutional obligation if
democratic liberty and the federalism that secures it are to endure. . . . Although
it is the obligation of all officers of the Government to respect the constitutional
design, the federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure
and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for [the Court] to admit inability to
intervene when one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too
far.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577–78 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
37 Yoo, supra note 24, at 1357.
38 Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46
VILL. L. REV. 951, 952 (2001); see also Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, Questions for the
Critics of Judicial Review, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 354 (2003) (offering textual and structural
justifications for judicial review).
39 Yoo, supra note 24, at 1402.
40 See Prakash & Yoo, supra note 38, at 361; Yoo, supra note 24, at 1330–31.
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Defending the Court’s role in catching congressional overreach—and
thus alerting Congress to the importance of federalism—Lynn Baker
explains another angle of federalism the Court is uniquely equipped to protect. She distinguishes between vertical federalism—the ability of the states,
collectively, to influence and protect their institutional prerogative in
national policymaking—and horizontal federalism—each state’s separate,
sovereign interests and authority.41 Ironically, then, Wechsler’s, Choper’s,
and Kramer’s political safeguards exacerbate the potential for horizontal
aggrandizement: “The state-based allocation of representation in the federal
lawmaking process facilitates congressional responsiveness to state-based
interests and preferences, and the majoritarian nature of that process permits a simple majority of states to impose its will on the minority.”42 Equal
representation in the Senate, for example, results in disproportionate distribution of “the federal fiscal and regulatory ‘pie.’ ”43 Thus, “[t]his systematic
wealth redistribution obviously infringes on the autonomy of the states that
are burdened by, rather than beneficiaries of, this redistribution.”44 The
Court should therefore limit the federal government’s ability to intrude on
state sovereignty despite the imprimatur of a state majority.
Though there have been some attempts to find a middle ground
between these two positions,45 clear battle lines between political safeguards
and judicial review persist. Both sides agree on the presence of political safeguards. The debate comes down to judicial review—does the Court have a
role to play in maintaining the balance of power between the states and the
federal government, or not? The stakes are high, and the answer requires
great care and precision. It is thus a bit disheartening to consider the ease
with which Professor Gerken wipes away this noble fight in favor of contextdriven “flavors” of federalism. If there is to be any principled force preserved
in our nation’s carefully crafted compact, the only flavor of federalism worth
its salt is the one mandated by the Constitution itself.
II.

ONE THEORY, TWO SAFEGUARDS

Though many scholars who favor judicial review criticize the efficacy of
political safeguards in our current political environment, these criticisms do
little to advance their position.46 Federalism—the allocation of power
41 See generally Baker, supra note 38.
42 Id. at 966.
43 Id. (citation omitted).
44 Id.
45 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349
(2001) (suggesting that judicial review of process rather than substance might be a logical
compromise); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (explaining the need for
the Court to ensure an unambiguous statement before it will read a federal statute to
intrude on traditional state functions, in order to protect the function of the political
safeguards).
46 See Clark, supra note 19, at 1700 (rejecting the view that “the rise of the modern
administrative state not only makes it impossible to enforce the procedural safeguards in
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between the federal government and the states—was perhaps the single most
important issue at the time of the Founding. The centrality of this concern
was not lost on the framers or ratifiers. Returning to that time, and the product of thoughtful debate and drafting, one multi-layered model for protecting the federalism balance is evident. Federalism was, and is, doubly
guarded: political safeguards and judicial review. This model must guide and
frame the analysis still today.47
While no one seriously questions the inclusion of procedural protections
in the Constitution, a brief review of these provisions is a helpful starting
point for a grounded analysis. For example, the Constitution mandates
equal representation in the Senate,48 gives states control over voter qualifications49 and congressional districting,50 and requires the participation of the
Senate in the making of every federal law.51 There is no doubt these provisions were meant to protect the states. In just one instance of explicit support for this premise, James Madison explained that “the equal vote allowed
to each state, is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual states, and an instrument for preserving
that residuary sovereignty.”52 Nevertheless, Madison never suggested this was
the only instrument for that purpose. Quite the contrary, a close analysis
reveals the framers doubly guarded this most essential division of sovereignty.
A.

History

At the time of the Founding, the magnitude of adequately allocating and
protecting the division of power and sovereignty between the federal government and the states could not be overstated. As John Yoo explains,
“[o]pponents and supporters of the new Constitution were [so] obsessed
with the relationship between the federal and state governments” that even
those critical of an originalist approach should be reluctant to minimize the
historical context.53 The American Revolution was sparked by dissatisfaction
over the allocation of power between Great Britain and the Colonies. In our
that context, but also counsels disregarding such safeguards more broadly as a kind of
compensating adjustment,” and instead explaining that “[b]ecause these safeguards are so
carefully spelled out in the Constitution and were so central to its adoption, courts could
not read them out of the document and still remain faithful to their oath to uphold ‘this
Constitution’” (citation omitted)).
47 Cf. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905), overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (“The Constitution is a written
instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it meant when adopted it
means now.”).
48 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
49 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
50 Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
51 Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (bicameralism); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (advice and consent); id. art.
V (constitutional amendment).
52 THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 332 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
53 Yoo, supra note 24, at 1359 (responding to criticisms about selective use of history
based on incomplete information, Yoo explains that “[f]ederalism . . . did not suffer from
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first attempt to do it better, the Articles of Confederation ultimately crumbled because a misallocation of power rendered a unified government
inept.54 The Constitution represented the third, and presumably final,
chance at a workable, sustainable “compound republic.”55 Precision was
paramount.
In light of the Articles’ failure, many of the framers sought to diminish
the role of states, granting them only subordinate participation in the
national government.56 But that view ultimately lost out at the Philadelphia
Convention. Advocating for ratification, James Madison explained that,
under the Constitution, the federal government’s “jurisdiction extends to
certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several states a residuary
and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.”57 The Great Compromise
granting equal representation in the Senate,58 and the Senate’s pervasive
contact in all lawmaking processes, provided state sovereignty with significant
protection.59 But even then—before the Seventeenth Amendment mandated popular election of senators, before the Civil War Amendments radically reordered the balance of power, and before the New Deal Era
established the administrative state—procedural safeguards were not, alone,
enough to render sovereignty “inviolable.”
John Yoo highlights a couple of these potential shortcomings. He
explains that, because each senator had one vote, there may be a temptation
and an opportunity for senators to represent powerful interest groups rather
than the institutional interests of the state.60 Furthermore, Yoo points out
that, though state-centric in composition, the Senate is a national actor, and
protection of state sovereignty risks being overpowered when it acts in that
national capacity.61
During the ratification debates, such fears consumed Anti-Federalists,
who were unsatisfied with assurances of limited, enumerated powers62 and
such neglect. Federalists and Anti-Federalists conducted an extensive, sophisticated
debate . . . over the spheres to be occupied by the federal and state governments”).
54 Notably, the Articles of Confederation lacked a federal judiciary, which was “especially noticeable when it came to questions of federalism, for no independent tribunal
existed that could draw the lines between the proper spheres of the national and state
governments.” Id. at 1365.
55 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 282 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
56 See Yoo, supra note 24, at 1367–68.
57 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 210 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (emphasis
added).
58 The importance of this safeguard is underscored by that fact that it is today the only
provision in the Constitution incapable of being amended. See U.S. CONST. art. V (declaring that “no State . . . shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate”).
59 See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text (laying out the political safeguards).
60 Yoo, supra note 24, at 1370.
61 Id.
62 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 71 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (“[The
federal government’s] jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern
all the members of the republic . . . . The [states] which can extend their care to all those
other objects . . . will retain their due authority and activity.”).
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protections of political safeguards63 touted by the Federalists. In addition to
inherent shortcomings in the procedural system, Anti-Federalists feared the
“allegedly universal[ ] principle of eighteenth century political science: that
any group of rulers would seek to expand their power at the expense of the
people.”64 If these procedural and structural safeguards were to be the only
restraint on congressional power, Congress alone would have the power to
impose limits on itself.
It was at this point in the historical “dialogue,” with Anti-Federalists firm
in their resolve to denounce self-imposed congressional limits, that Federalists turned their attention to the protection offered by a federal judiciary.65
Finally acknowledging the real threat to state sovereignty, James Wilson
explained:
[I]t is possible that the legislature . . . may transgress the bounds assigned to
it, and an act may pass, in the usual mode, notwithstanding that transgression;
but when it comes to be discussed before the judges,—when they consider its
principles, and find it to be incompatible with the superior power of the
Constitution,—it is their duty to pronounce it void.66

He was not alone in his understanding, as the power of the Court to
check Congress became something of a ratification rallying cry for Federalists
eager to gain the cooperation of Anti-Federalists.67
However, it was federal power the Anti-Federalists feared, not just congressional power. Yoo outlines three of their primary apprehensions about
the federal judiciary. First, there was a concern the Court would not be
bound by rules of interpretation. Second, the Anti-Federalists viewed judges
as equally susceptible to corruption. And third, there was no check on the
Court’s decisions.68 Nevertheless, while engaging in these concerns it
became evident the debate was about the kind of authority the courts would
63 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 252 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005)
(“[E]ach of the principal branches of the federal government will owe its existence more
or less to the favor of the state governments, and must consequently feel a dependence,
which is much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious, than too overbearing
towards them.”).
64 Yoo, supra note 24, at 1381–82 (explaining the Anti-Federalists’ view that
“[p]archment barriers . . . could not stand before the natural instinct of the rulers to
expand their powers”).
65 Id. at 1359, 1383.
66 James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 1, 7, 1787), in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (2000), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a3_2_
1s11.html.
67 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 415 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005)
(“[W]here the will of the legislature declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of
the people declared in the constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter,
rather than the former.”). Moreover, if we concede, and most do, the power of judicial
review generally, it must also be true that it includes the review of questions about the
allocation of power. No Bill of Rights existed when the Constitution was ratified. See 400,
supra note 24, at 1371.
68 Yoo, supra note 24, at 1389–90.
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have to resolve disputes, not whether they would have authority to do so.69 It
is this context—the “sophisticated, long-running dialogue between Federalists and Anti-Federalists throughout the states”70—in which it becomes evident that “[u]nder the Framers’ conception of judicial review, the federal
courts were created [in large part] to protect state rights.”71
B.

Text

This Note assumes the logical next step in a principled evaluation of the
safeguards of federalism is the text of the Constitution: “For the question is
not, what did the framers of the Constitution hope or desire with reference to
judicial review, but what they did do with reference to it.”72 For some time
proponents of judicial review in this area seemed content to rely on the structure of the Constitution,73 or, very generally, the judiciary’s “arising under”
jurisdiction—a phrase that has “long confounded judges and scholars.”74
However, recent scholarship has offered a clearer understanding about the
scope of the Article III “arising under” provision and its significant relation to
the Supremacy Clause. Therein lies a compelling and textually explicit constitutional foundation for judicial review of federal laws alleged to exceed the
scope of congressional power. Even here, a brief gloss of the specific historical context is helpful as a way of understanding the trajectory of the constitutional text.
As they did in so many areas of our political system, the Framers anticipated inevitable conflicts between state and federal law, and carefully considered the best methods to resolve those conflicts. Between Edmund
Randolph’s Virginia Plan and William Paterson’s New Jersey Plan, three principal options emerged as to how to best resolve conflict between the federal
69 Id. at 1391. Judge Wilkinson offers a helpful analogy on this point. He explains
that
this concern about abuse can be understood by envisioning a hard-fought basketball game. The officials may be too quick on the whistle and call too many fouls,
and they may have, in some cases, an effect upon the actual outcome of the game
itself. But the fact that referees might unfortunately abuse their authority does
not lead to the conclusion that they should have no authority. Someone must
enforce the rules of the game. In our system, the Constitution sets the rules,
and . . . the judiciary is the ultimate interpreter of them. In law, as in basketball,
we have long ago rejected the notion that it is best for a contest to have no referees at all.
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1692 (2004).
70 Yoo, supra note 24, at 1384.
71 Id. at 1391.
72 EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: ITS LEGAL AND HISTORICAL
BASIS AND OTHER ESSAYS 2 (1914).
73 See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1505 (2001) (emphasizing “the concept of a limited, written Constitution and the existence of a judiciary”).
74 Anthony J. Bellia Jr., The Origins of Article III “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 57 DUKE L.J.
263, 266 (2007).
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government and the states. Initially, both Plans provided for a national judiciary and the use of force to enforce the laws of the federal government
against the states.75 The Virginia Plan also included a congressional negative
(or veto) on state laws, whereby Congress could “negative all laws passed by
the several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature
the articles of Union” in order to ensure federal supremacy.76 The New
Jersey Plan, on the other hand, included a supremacy provision, which made
supreme those laws of the United States “made by virtue & in pursuance of
the powers hereby . . . vested in them.”77
Ultimately, the Virginia Plan prevailed over the New Jersey Plan, but
debate continued regarding the proper means by which to ensure federal
supremacy. Some, like Madison, were weary of coercive force. Instead, he
strongly advocated an unlimited congressional negative.78 However, “the
negative would have allowed Congress to determine for itself the scope of its
powers vis-à-vis the states”79—a notion that terrified Anti-Federalists already
fearful of a tyrannical federal government. In the end, the Convention
rejected the negative.80
Immediately following rejection of the negative, Luther Martin proposed, as a “substitution,” a supremacy provision not unlike the one from the
abandoned New Jersey Plan.81 The Convention unanimously adopted this
supremacy provision “thereby delegating to judges (state and federal) what
previously had been the veto’s function of voiding state law contrary to fed-

75 Id. at 294–98.
76 Id. at 294 (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21
(Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)).
77 Id. at 296 (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note
76, at 245).
78 See Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 1031, 1044–45 (1997) (“Madison was convinced that the fundamental defect of the
Confederation was that Congress lacked the sanctioning power necessary to make the
states carry out its decisions. . . . [His] obsession with the internal vices of state politics
convinced him that both the stability of the federal system and the pursuit of justice
required giving the new Congress an unlimited negative on all state laws.”).
79 Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 91, 108 (2003).
80 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 76, at 28.
81 Bellia, supra note 74, at 299–300. The provision asserted:
[T]he legislative acts of the United States made by virtue and in pursuance of the
articles of the union, and all treaties made and ratified under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the respective states, so far as those acts
or treaties shall relate to the said states or their citizens and that the judiciaries of
the several states shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the
respective laws of the individual states to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
supra note 76, at 286–87).
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eral law,”82 and “requir[ing] courts to police the bounds of federal power by
conditioning the supremacy of federal statutes on compliance with ‘this Constitution.’ ”83 Thus, even in isolation, the Supremacy Clause intimates judicial review by federal courts as a proper mechanism for maintaining the
balance between federal and state power.
Not coincidentally, the very next matter addressed and decided by the
delegates at the Convention was a jurisdictional provision of federal court
power. The jurisdiction of the federal judiciary would extend to “cases arising under laws passed by the general Legislature, and to such other questions
as involve the National peace and harmony.”84 Thus, by giving a national
body (now the judiciary instead of the legislature) the power to enforce the
supremacy of federal law, the “arising under” jurisdiction was meant to “compensate somewhat for the loss of the [congressional negative].”85 The Arising Under Clause, then, reinforces the role for the federal courts in reviewing
and enforcing federal laws.
While the supremacy provision and the “arising under” provision, as
originally drafted, already provided for federal judicial review of federalism
cases, the Convention went on to “conform the language of the Supremacy
Clause to the language of the Arising Under Clause, strengthening the efficacy of both.”86 After a series of proposals and revisions on both provisions,
the parallel between the final products is striking:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land . . . .87
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority.88

This symmetry was “intentional and structurally crucial.”89 The Supremacy
Clause, in conjunction with the Arising Under Clause, “provided a limited
82 James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality
of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 730 (1998) (citing 2
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 76, at 28–29).
83 Clark, supra note 79, at 109.
84 4 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 76, at 221 (emphasis added).
85 Liebman & Ryan, supra note 82, at 732; see also Bellia, supra note 74, at 301 (“Presumably, Madison particularized the ‘arising under’ category of jurisdiction to make certain, after the defeat of the negative, that Congress would have power to enable inferior
federal courts to administer federal law in the first instance as a means of maintaining its
supremacy.”).
86 Bellia, supra note 74, at 301.
87 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
88 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
89 Liebman & Ryan, supra note 82, at 708.
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means for Congress, through the judiciary, to ensure the supremacy of federal law.”90
Furthermore, though the language is “virtually identical,”91 the central
difference between the Clauses is equally as instructive. The Supremacy
Clause, and only the Supremacy Clause, qualifies its force to only those laws
“made in Pursuance” of the Constitution.92 Thus, the “conditional nature of
the Supremacy Clause”93 indicates “courts must necessarily consider and
resolve challenges to the constitutionality of federal statutes.”94 In other
words, “[b]y its terms . . . the Supremacy Clause suggests that courts should
prefer federal statutes to contrary state law only if the statutes themselves fall
within the scope of Congress’ enumerated powers.”95 The same condition does
not extend to the federal judiciary’s ability to hear the case under the Arising
Under Clause; thus, the Court hears all cases arising under the “Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and all Treaties made . . . under their Authority,”96 but only makes supreme those laws “made in Pursuance [of the Constitution]”97—necessitating review of the extent to which the laws conform to
constitutionally defined congressional power.
The conditional nature of the Supremacy Clause, emphasized by its relation to the Arising Under Clause, was a central feature of the compromise
between Federalist and Anti-Federalists. Alexander Hamilton was explicit
about this balance in Federalist No. 33. After emphasizing the need for a
supreme and unifying federal law, he went on to qualify:
[I]t will not follow from [the Supremacy Clause] that acts of the larger society which are not pursuant to its constitutional powers but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the smaller societies will become the
supreme law of the land. These will be merely acts of usurpation and will
deserve to be treated as such. . . . [The Clause] expressly confines this
supremacy to laws made pursuant to the constitution.98

Thus, the Supremacy Clause is a two-way street. As Bradford Clark
explains, “the Clause pursues two distinct goals simultaneously: to secure the
supremacy of federal law and to prevent Congress from exceeding the scope
of its enumerated powers.”99 It is a compromise that simultaneously facilitates an able union100 and entrenches a layer of judicial protection for states
from unconstitutional encroachment by the federal government. The con90 Bellia, supra note 74, at 304.
91 Clark, supra note 19, at 1688.
92 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
93 Clark, supra note 79, at 99.
94 Id. at 92.
95 Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
96 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
97 Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
98 THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 174–75 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
99 Clark, supra note 79, at 99.
100 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 174–75 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005)
(noting that supremacy “flows immediately and necessarily from the institution of a federal
government” because otherwise the Constitution would be “a mere treaty, dependent on
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text, notion of compromise, and parallel language between the Supremacy
Clause and the Arising Under Clause compel recognition of judicial review
over constitutionally mandated limits on federal lawmaking power.
C.

Structure

The constitutional text itself provides a critical foundation for understanding the judicial role in federalism cases; however, that understanding is
incomplete absent consideration of the structural principles embedded
within. Structure informs and adds dimension to text. Here, however, complexity exists because the structure of the Constitution works both in and
around the conceptualization of the judicial role in federalism cases. In
other words, the structure of the Constitution both offers another constitutional hook for judicial participation in federalism cases and informs the
exercise of that participation as developed in the history, text, and structure.
While all signs point in the same direction, it is the whole of the Constitution—in context, substance, and form—that offers the clearest directive for
the exercise of judicial review.101 It is helpful, then, to turn to this last component to frame and fuse that which came before.
As adopted, judicial review stems from two structural principles: a written Constitution that grants only limited and enumerated federal power, and
the very existence of the judiciary within a separation of powers scheme.102
First, our written Constitution inherently implies that the federal government
may exercise only that authority explicitly surrendered by the people. Ironically, perhaps, this concept is fundamental to Wechsler’s contention that the
background, default authority is retained by the states and federal law is only
“interstitial” in nature.103 Moreover, in most contexts, state law applies
unless displaced by a federal law “made in Pursuance” of the Constitution.104
Thus, the very nature of a written Constitution ultimately points back to the
Supremacy Clause, which necessitates judicial review.105
Intratextual consistency and the canon against surplusage offer another
illuminating structural axiom stemming from a written Constitution. To say
there is no judicial review of congressional power—that Congress may exercise federal power up to, and limited only by, its own discretion—would
make superfluous the specific and enumerated grants of power defined in
Article I, especially the Necessary and Proper Clause. Thus, “[a]n absence of
judicial review would transform our constitutional system into one of legislative supremacy, which contradicts the Constitution’s core principle of a
the good faith of the parties, and not a government; which is only another word for
POLITICAL POWER AND SUPREMACY”).
101 Some go a step further, suggesting “the structure of the federal government itself
dictates the existence of judicial review.” Prakash & Yoo, supra note 38, at 358.
102 Id. at 359–60.
103 See supra Section II.A.
104 See supra Section III.B.
105 See supra Section III.B.
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national government of limited powers.”106 In other words, without judicial
review, our Constitution could be altered and amended through the ordinary
lawmaking process—which cannot be the case if Article V (the rigorous and
constitutionally mandated process for amending the Constitution) is to mean
anything.107
Second, the separation of powers between the branches of the federal
government and the mere existence of an independent federal judiciary indicate a judicial role for checking congressional overreach. In Federalist No. 78,
Hamilton wrote:
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts. A constitution is in fact, and must be, regarded by the judges as a
fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as
well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative
body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the
two . . . the constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of
the people to the intention of their agents.108

The Judiciary interprets the Constitution in order to rule on the constitutionality of a challenged law. It would undermine its function, and indeed
veneration for the Constitution itself, if the Court were required to hear “all
cases arising under” and enforce them without regard to their constitutionality. Eliminating both the judicial check on congressional authority and its
power of judicial review would be a “perverse [and] asymmetrical allocation
of power.”109 Such a disadvantage “would damage the separation of powers
by undermining the independence of the judiciary and its ability to resist the
encroachments of the other branches.”110
As important as the now well-established role of the judiciary in federalism cases is the way in which the structure of the Constitution informs that
role. There is no one “federalism clause” in the Constitution; yet “references
to federalism pervade the constitutional scheme.”111 It is within the underlying and overarching scheme, then, that “[t]he Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two
106 See Prakash & Yoo, supra note 73, at 1469.
107 See id. Article V requires agreement from two-thirds of both the Senate and the
House (or state legislatures), and three-fourths of the state legislatures or state conventions
in order to amend the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. V.
108 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 415 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005). Here,
the “intention of the people” is something much broader than the intent expressed
through the immediate political process. Cf. Richard W. Garnett, Symposium: Legislative
Prayer and Judicial Review, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 27, 2013, 1:13 PM), http://www.scotusblog
.com/2013/09/symposium-legislative-prayer-and-judicial-review/ (explaining that
“[j]udicial review is one important mechanism . . . for holding later majorities to the earlier deal, and for delivering on the promises that earlier majorities made to later
minorities”).
109 Prakash & Yoo, supra note 38, at 361.
110 Id.
111 Patrick M. Garry, A One-Sided Federalism Revolution: The Unaddressed Constitutional
Compromise on Federalism and Individual Rights, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 851, 855 (2006).
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political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion
by the other.”112 Split sovereignty was quickly reinforced by the Tenth
Amendment, which made explicit the residual powers of state sovereigns,
underscored the limited nature of federal power, and, in so doing, made
permanent the inviolable sovereignty retained by the states.
Two conclusions flow from the subtle, yet central, conception of “our
federalism.” First, the value of state sovereignty permeates and informs every
word of constitutional text. Thus, its importance informs the Court’s role in
judicial review of congressional overreach. This is not to say the judiciary
should frame its analysis in terms of state sovereignty—no part of the text
gives it that function—rather, understanding the reason for limited federal
power offers purpose and direction for imposing constitutionally mandated
limits on federal power. Because the split atom of sovereignty supports the
American system of government, it is paramount for the judiciary to hold
firmly the lines drawn by the Constitution against federal incursion of state
sovereignty.
Second, the permanence of states as sovereign entities within our system
of government has critical, albeit narrow, force of its own. In addition to the
many provisions accentuating the importance of state sovereignty, the Tenth
Amendment is the clearest place to identify the source of this force.113
Though the limits of Tenth Amendment are largely “structural, not substantive,”114 there is a substantive component inherent in that very structure. If
sovereignty is the ability to maintain one’s own government, and to make and
enforce one’s own laws, then, based on the permanence of state sovereignty
embedded in the Constitution, the Constitution guards at least that much for
the states without regard to limits on federal power. This is a narrow,115 but
powerful, exception to the otherwise consistent constitutional directive for
courts to protect state sovereignty only by enforcing the constitutional limits
of federal power.116
The Constitution’s history, text, and structure—individually but more
importantly, together—require judicial review of federal laws that challenge
112 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
113 See generally New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (suggesting the Tenth
Amendment has some independent force of its own).
114 South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988) (citing Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537–54 (1985)).
115 Note, this is a different proposition than the one put forth in National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976), which sought to protect a zone of “integral” and
“traditional” state functions. See infra notes 137–39 and accompanying text (elaborating
on the very narrow, independent force of the Tenth Amendment).
116 This is a distinction Professor Gerken does not identify. Thus, she erroneously
relies on anti-commandeering cases to support her view that courts should conduct a federalism analysis in terms of state sovereignty. Anti-commandeering cases, however, more
accurately flow from the narrow positive protection of state sovereignty found in the Tenth
Amendment, and are in this way fundamentally different than other federalism cases. See
infra notes 137–39 and accompanying text.
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the scope of Congress’s enumerated, and therefore limited, powers. The
political safeguards of federalism offer the states a voice in the lawmaking
process, but they do nothing to negate the Court’s role of ensuring that the
product of that process conforms to the dictates of the Constitution.
III.

FRAMING
A.

THE

JUDICIAL ANALYSIS

The Theoretical Framework

There is one federalism. The safeguards of federalism are complex in
their artistically woven security, twofold in process, but ultimately one, unified design that defends our structure of government. There is no choice in
the matter. Context cannot drive either the safeguard selected, or its application—the Constitution drives the analysis. Together, and respectively, political safeguards and judicial review protect a state sovereignty that is malleable
at the margins (political safeguards), enduring as to its very existence (anticommandeering principle), and inviolable to federal incursion (judicial
review enforcing the limits of enumerated federal powers).
As most do, this Note takes for granted the political safeguards as one
element of federalism protection. Thus, focusing on the judiciary, Part II
demonstrated the constitutionally established role for the Court in protecting the federalism prescribed by the history, text, and structure of our Constitution. Because there is one constitutional theory dictating the roles of the
political process and the Court, it follows that the same theory must necessarily inform the functioning of those roles. The Court has a constitutional
duty to ensure that only those laws made in pursuance of the Constitution
become supreme over conflicting state law. As the last line of defense protecting the delicate federal balance, the Court is charged with ensuring that
the supreme law of the land conforms to the limited power vested in its makers. Thus, the Court must approach these questions in terms of constitutional limits (negative implications of enumerated powers) on federal
power—not in terms of state sovereignty. To be sure, state sovereignty is a
real and present consideration for the Court—structure informs text—but
the judicial role in that structural balance is defined in terms of limits on
federal power.117 From the Court’s perspective, limited federal government
is a means to a state sovereignty end.
Conversely, procedural protections can be conceived in state sovereignty
terms. The text of the Constitution makes it so.118 In other words, it is
because of the sovereign interests of the states that they may influence, and
thus limit, federal power—state sovereignty is a means to an end of limited
federal power. Indeed, the political safeguards represent a practical reason
why the Court’s role should not be conceived in state sovereignty terms.
117 To reiterate, the Court limits federal power by enforcing the boundaries of the enumerated powers laid out in the Constitution, based on its charge to hear cases “arising
under” the laws of the United States and to make supreme only those laws made in pursuance of the Constitution.
118 See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
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There is no way for the Court to “mark[ ] the outer limits of federal authority
by identifying the bounds of state power”119 because there are no fixed
boundaries to state power. State power is (a) residual, and (b) malleable
based on the vigor of political safeguards. This is the reason the Court’s
analysis in National League of Cities v. Usery could not stand the test of time.120
Thus, the dual safeguards of federalism—the political process and judicial review—are not in any sense incompatible. While, contextually, there is
overlap and sometimes tension, conceptually, they use different means, serve
different ends, and maintain a different framework of analysis.121 When the
Court protects state sovereignty by imposing the limits of enumerated powers
on congressional legislation, a political safeguards objection is a non
sequitur. This is a single, cohesive, constitutionally mandated theory in
action.122
Professor Gerken disfavors a single theory of federalism protection
because she overlooks the Constitution’s text, informed by history and structure.123 Without such a theory, she misconceives the framework through
which the Court’s analysis should take place. Despite her criticisms of cases
that “rely on state sovereignty to limit federal power,”124 she finds this line of
doctrine “more manageable, more comprehensible, and therefore more
likely to endure” than those that focus on limits to federal power.125 But
such affection is misplaced on a framework divorced from—indeed, antithetical to—the Constitution. The judicial role is to ensure all federal laws, subject to the jurisdictional limits of Article III, conform to the Constitution
before they become supreme.

119 Gerken, supra note 9, at 96.
120 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 548 (1985) (overruling Usery and expressing “doubt that courts ultimately can identify principled constitutional limitations on the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers over the States
merely by relying on a priori definitions of state sovereignty . . . . because of the elusiveness
of objective criteria for ‘fundamental’ elements of state sovereignty”); id. at 550 (highlighting “the fact that the States remain sovereign as to all powers not vested in Congress or
denied them by the Constitution offers no guidance about where the frontier between
state and federal power lies”).
121 Importantly, both safeguards protect the same—the only—federalism.
122 Here, the “balance” seems double-stacked in favor of the states. However, the
Supremacy Clause is a two-way street, and this analysis is merely confined to the more
controversial of the two directives.
123 See Gerken, supra note 2, at 1550–51 (“We need not hew exclusively to one vision of
federalism. We can choose all of them at once. . . . Every flavor of federalism can be found
somewhere in our system. . . . [T]here are many federalisms, not one.”).
124 See Gerken, supra note 9, at 86, 114 (concluding even though decisions defining
federal power in relation to the states rightly take a relational approach, they are “misguided” because they fall short of “captur[ing] the deeply integrated, highly interactive
relationship that exists between the states and federal government”).
125 Id. at 86–87.
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Framing for the Future

To recap, there is one federalism, not many. Furthermore, the Constitution establishes a role for the courts in federalism cases and defines that role
in terms of limits on federal power.126 Professor Gerken has no counterclaim on this point because she disregards the Constitution’s text. This Section challenges Professor Gerken’s support for state-centric analysis and her
criticism of judicially imposed limits on enumerated federal power, by her
own standards of endurance and manageability.127
1.

Defining Federal Power in Relation to the States

Though Professor Gerken offers a litany of justifications for defining federal power in relation to the states,128 such justifications are largely undermined by (1) a judiciary with the power to enforce limits on federal
power,129 and (2) an understanding of the value served by state sovereignty.130 More specific engagement of these claims is outside the scope of
this Note. Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting the line of cases that “define
federal power in relation to the states,” which Professor Gerken champions as
“more cogent, more intuitive, and more likely to last past the next round of
federalism fights.”131
She places in this category of cogency and endurance Gregory v. Ashcroft,132 New York v. United States,133 Printz v. United States,134 the Eleventh
Amendment cases, cases involving the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and National Leagues of Cities v. Usery.135 While she is right, in a
cursory sense, that each of the aforementioned cases uses state sovereignty as
a launching pad to limit federal power, she is wrong to group them together
as members of the same class. Untangling this contrived coalition reveals the
impotence of a general rule that defines the limits of federal power in relation to the states.
Gregory was decided in relation to the states, and rightly so. It was not a
case imposing constitutional limits on congressional power; it was, rather, a
case of statutory interpretation. There, the Court expressed the clear statement rule to ensure that when Congress regulates within its power (checked
only by the political process), the political process actually has an opportunity to safeguard state autonomy.136 Thus, that case was fundamentally dif126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

See supra Part II.
See Gerken, supra note 9, at 87, 95.
Id. at 96–97.
See supra Part II.
See infra Part IV.
Gerken, supra note 9, at 95.
501 U.S. 452 (1991).
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464.
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ferent than cases asking whether a given regulation is within congressional
power in the first place.
New York and Printz are likewise misplaced in this group. The anti-commandeering principle flows from the narrow substantive structure of the
Tenth Amendment.137 In other words, the Tenth Amendment does not
define the scope of state sovereignty against which federal power pushes, but
it does recognize the permanence of state sovereignty. In doing so, it protects sovereignty as such—not “integral” or “traditional” state functions,138
but rather those powers inseparable from sovereignty itself (i.e., making
one’s own laws). However,
to say that the Constitution assumes the continued role of the States is to say
little about the nature of that role. . . . and the fact that the States remain
sovereign as to all powers not vested in Congress or denied them by the
Constitution offers no guidance about where the frontier between state and
federal power lies.139

Therefore, the anti-commandeering cases are categorically different, and not
instructive for the Court’s more general role in policing constitutional limits
on federal power.
The Eleventh Amendment cases, and cases about the Enforcement
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, suffer from similar categorical misplacement. Professor Gerken recognizes that the focus on states in Eleventh
Amendment cases is “overdetermined given the nature of the constitutional
inquiry. The same is probably true of the state-centered Fourteenth Amendment cases, where state action is a necessary condition for regulation.”140
Thus, it is misleading to point to such outliers as representative of a general
class.
That leaves only Usery141—“unsound in principle and unworkable in
practice”142—as the sole representative of a general approach that defines
federal power in relation to the states. Its nine-year life is not the poster child
for manageability and endurance on which one would want to rest her
case.143
2.

Limits of Enumerated Federal Powers

Much of Professor Gerken’s advocacy for framing state sovereignty as the
means for limiting federal power stems from what she perceives as the short137 See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text.
138 See Usery, 426 U.S. at 851.
139 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985).
140 Gerken, supra note 9, at 97 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620–22,
626 (2000)).
141 426 U.S. 833 (protecting a zone of traditional state functions from federal
incursion).
142 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.
143 In fairness, Gerken describes Usery as a “swing[ ] and [a] miss[ ]” even though it
purported to use her favored framework. Gerken, supra note 9, at 100 n.86. The point,
however, is that, in context, Usery is the only model available to her.
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comings of “defining federal power in isolation.”144 She contends that when,
“[r]ather than trac[ing] the (state) boundaries that federal power cannot
cross, the Court demarcates federal power without looking to the states,”145 it
results in “a failure on almost any measure.”146 Put differently, she finds that
a commitment to constitutionally defined limits on federal power turns out
to be nothing more than “identify[ing] limits through sheer force of
logic”147—distinctions without a difference. Her misgivings reduce to two
main points.148
First, Professor Gerken is skeptical of categorical limits, wherein the
Court declares that, “by definition, something isn’t within the ambit of Article
I.”149 Most notably, she refers to two categorical distinctions featured in the
Court’s more recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence: the economicnoneconomic distinction,150 and the activity-inactivity distinction.151 She is
unsettled by the notion that “distinctions that played no role in prior cases
suddenly [took] on doctrinal salience.”152 However, far from unsettling, the
144 Id. at 97.
145 Id. (citing Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow Powers of Article I, 123 YALE L.J. 2044, 2047,
2050–51 (2014)).
146 Id. at 87.
147 Id.
148 In a third point, Gerken raises distinct concerns about the Necessary and Proper
Clause; namely regarding the refusal by some members of the Court—those insistent on
enforcing limits inherent in constitutionally enumerated powers—to apply the Necessary
and Proper Clause as a blank check. Id. at 105–07. She worries, first, about the malleability of the integral part principle derived from McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 418 (1819), and featured in the Court’s modern jurisprudence. See id. at 105–06 (first
citing NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); and then citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S.
1 (2005)). Second, she worries about the independent meaning said to flow from the
words “necessary” and “proper.” See id. at 105–07; see also Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
2077, 2101 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining that a law can be
necessary but not proper); NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592 (same); Raich, 545 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421–22) (same). Professor Gerken’s
criticisms of the Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence that imposes limits on congressional power are, generally speaking, subject to the same shortcomings as her two
more central arguments regarding categorical distinctions and level of generality. Therefore, instead of rehashing the same arguments, the Necessary and Proper Clause is not
taken up directly by this Note, but is indirectly addressed in this Section. For a thoughtful
account of the original meaning of “necessary and proper,” see GARY LAWSON ET AL., THE
ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 2 (2010) (acknowledging the Constitutional
Convention’s “silen[ce] on the meaning of the necessary and proper power” and turning
to other meaningful influences on the framing generation like agency law, administrative
law, and corporate charters (quoting BERNARD H. SIEGAN, THE SUPREME COURT’S CONSTITUTION: AN INQUIRY INTO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ITS IMPACT ON SOCIETY 1 (1987))). They ultimately suggest that “necessary” was understood as a “means” term implying a moderately
close fit to the end, and “proper” implied an obligation to take account of the relevant
effects of an action. Id. at 1–12.
149 Gerken, supra note 9, at 104.
150 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
151 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2587.
152 Gerken, supra note 9, at 104.
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Court’s resolve to conform to that which came before is comforting and commendable. While it is true that cases like Lopez and NFIB were the first to
explicitly identify these distinctions, the very point of limiting principles is
that they reflect what is true of all prior precedent.153
In Lopez, a majority of the Court expressed the sentiment that post–New
Deal era jurisprudence pushed the Commerce Clause to, and perhaps over,
its constitutional breaking point. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged: “Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long
steps down [the] road” of “pil[ing] inference upon inference in a manner
that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.”154 However, he went on to resolutely assert, “[W]e decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require us to conclude that the Constitution’s
enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated . . . .
This we are unwilling to do.”155 The Court was not willing to expand prior
caselaw, but, importantly, neither did it overrule. Instead, it committed itself
to a limiting principle—here, commercial activity.
Therefore, the Court did not create these categories out of thin air. Our
Constitution and our federal structure imply limits on federal power. During
a significant period in our nation’s history, there were, effectively, no limits
on congressional power. To recall the massive body of law developed in the
wake of that unadulterated deference would have catastrophic consequences
for the stability of our country:
[T]he Court as an institution and the legal system as a whole have an
immense stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it
has evolved to this point. Stare decisis operates with great force in counseling
us not to call in question the essential principles now in place respecting the
congressional power to regulate transactions of a commercial nature.156

Thus, the Court prudently discerned a limiting principle with the effect
of maintaining stability and enforcing limits inherent in the Constitution’s
enumerated powers and structure of split sovereignty. In sum, limiting principles, like the ones featured in Lopez and NFIB, have their origin in precedent, and, more importantly, in the Constitution itself—hardly indefensible.
Second, and relatedly, Professor Gerken voices skepticism about doctrinal distinctions—like economic-noneconomic and activity-inactivity157—
given the reality that many cases “boil down to the level of generality at which
153 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (synthesizing prior caselaw and determining that “the
pattern is clear. Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.”).
154 Id. at 567.
155 Id. at 567–68.
156 Id. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
157 See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 9, at 105–06, 106 n.123 (“Even the active/inactive distinction the Court has drawn depends largely on the level of generality at which the activity
is cast.”).
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the regulated activity and the regulation is cast.”158 In essence, she adopts a
criticism familiar to due process and equal protection jurisprudence that, by
adjusting the level of generality at which they approach the issue, judges are
able to employ their own value judgments in the outcome.159 At first glance,
this analysis appears to hold some water, as evidenced in NFIB v. Sebelius. In
the Commerce Clause portion of that case, labeling the choice not to
purchase health insurance as an activity (within reach of Congress’s commerce power), or inactivity (beyond the scope of congressional power),
turned exclusively on the level of generality with which the Court defined the
relevant market.160 Plausibly, one could define the market as that for health
insurance—in which case those who do not purchase insurance are not in
the market. But equally as plausible, on at least some level, one could define
the relevant market as that for healthcare—in which all will inevitably participate. Thus, according to Professor Gerken and others, the choice ultimately
turns on the will of the judge.161
Admittedly, there is no clear “economic” or “activity” requirement—or
any bright-line limitation for that matter—written into the Commerce
Clause.162 There is, as Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded, some “legal uncertainty” in the application of categorical limits, as there is with all “enumerated powers . . . interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer limits”;163
however, “[a]ny possible benefit from eliminating this ‘legal uncertainty’
would be at the expense of the Constitution’s system of enumerated powers.”164 As Judge Easterbrook once put it, “Written instruments are meant to
have bite; and our Constitution not only is written but also establishes a system of limited government. If there are limits then there are boundaries to
be patrolled. Otherwise our government is not limited after all.”165 In other
words, if for the sake of certainty (achieved, here, by eliminating limiting
principles from the analysis) we sacrifice the commitment to constitutionally
158 Id. at 106.
159 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1087 (1990) (explaining that even when Justices claim to
look objectively to tradition, the evaluation necessarily “involves value judgments”).
160 See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
161 Judge Easterbrook fosters a similar argument, acknowledging the notion that
“[b]oosting the level of generality . . . can be a method of liberating judges from rules. . . .
Movements in the level of constitutional generality may be used to justify almost any outcome. It is correspondingly important that we have a consistent theory of choice.” Frank
H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 355, 358 (1992).
162 This complicates the otherwise reasonable method of approaching the level of generality as a part of the Constitution’s text. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 149 (1990). But see Easterbrook, supra note 161, at
362 (identifying a limit to Bork’s theory because it has the tendency to reject change even
on matters the Constitution was designed to accommodate).
163 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
164 Id.
165 Easterbrook, supra note 161, at 374 (citation omitted).
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enumerated and limited federal power, what have we achieved but the
destruction of that which we sought to protect?
Still, “[u]nless there is an answer” such that constitutional law is not left
to the absolute discretion of a judge, “we should abandon hope of government by law.”166 Justice Scalia submitted a similar plea for constraining analytical principles in the area of substantive due process in his opinion in
Michael H. v. Gerald D.,167 and proceeded to offer one:
Though the dissent has no basis for the level of generality it would select, we
do: We refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified. If, for
example, there were no societal tradition, either way, regarding the rights of
the natural father of a child adulterously conceived, we would have to consult, and (if possible) reason from, the traditions regarding natural fathers
in general.168

Defending Justice Scalia’s approach is beyond the scope of this Note, but
the purpose in raising it is twofold. First, level of generality is not an easy
problem, but it is one the Court must engage as an inherent element of serving the judicial function. Second, because of the difficulty and potential for
abuse present in defining the level of generality, a principled approach—that
is, one that dictates outcomes by a measurable source outside of the judge
himself—is necessary. It is also possible. Whether or not the Court has actually applied a principled basis when it sets the level of generality is a question
for another day—but it is a question separate from understanding the
Court’s role in enforcing constitutional limitations on congressional power.
It is not a persuasive argument to suggest the Court should not enforce
the boundaries of Article I’s enumerated powers because any such boundary
is marked by nothing more than the absolute discretion of five members. In
commerce cases, as elsewhere, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is.”169 When it says what the law
is, it is bound by text, precedent, and principle—and ultimately called upon
to exercise “merely judgment” not “will.”170
Categorical doctrinal distinctions and principled selections of the applicable level of generality are rooted in the Constitution’s enumerated powers171 and refined by settled tradition and precedent. Decisions that utilize
such tools to define federal power in terms of the powers granted in the
166 Id. at 350.
167 See 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J., dictum) (explaining that “a rule of law
that binds neither by text nor by any particular, identifiable tradition is no rule of law at
all,” but rather it “permit[s] judges to dictate rather than discern the society’s views”).
168 Id. (emphasis added). Justice Scalia went on to explain that even though a lack of
societal tradition might force the Court into a higher level of generality, in the case at
hand, “there [was] such a more specific tradition.” Id.
169 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added).
170 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
171 These categorical distinctions emanate from the text of the Constitution in two
ways: first, from an Article I perspective, as the units of negative implication inherent in
enumerated powers, and second, from an Article III perspective, as workable units by
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Constitution are enduring, then, because of their entrenchment with the text
of the Constitution; and they are manageable precisely because of the laboriously located limiting principles.172 The Constitution not only mandates a
single federalism, but, by its terms and vesting of power, it also provides for
its lasting security.
IV.

STATE SOVEREIGNTY: THE OTHER PART

OF THE

SPLIT ATOM

Perhaps the most unconvincing component of Professor Gerken’s argument is her premise that limiting federal power by enforcing the boundaries
of Article I results in “limits for limits’ sake.”173 That the written Constitution
charges the judiciary with an obligation to enforce the limits of enumerated
powers sufficiently undermines her theory—there is a separate good that
flows from upholding the edicts of the Constitution. But, equally as important, the great value in what the Constitution achieves by ensuring a limit to
federal power cannot be overstated. In other words, it would be wrong to
emphasize the value of state sovereignty only (and inaccurately) as a vehicle
by which the courts measure federal power. Instead, state sovereignty, as half
the “genius” of the split atom of sovereignty,174 is its own end.
In some ways, it seems unnecessary to march through the list of values
served by the state sovereignty aspect of federalism, given that the Court has
taken the charge upon itself to educate and remind readers time and time
again.175 Nevertheless, a brief review offers important insight into the ultimate purpose for which judges enforce the limits of Article I and thus help to
preserve the constitutional design.
Indeed, limited federal power and protection against tyranny is one goal
of split sovereignty; however, it is not the only goal. Our federal structure
offers the people a closeness and control over both levels of government that
could not be achieved if the sovereignty of either was sacrificed. The American system is such that “federalism [gives] each level of government certain
advantages and responsibilities . . . [and leaves] exploitation of the resulting
opportunities to govern open to the process of political competition.”176
Thus, federalism ensures to the people a meaningful choice in their own
governance. Moreover, that choice is protected in the cycle of the system
whereby limited quantities of power “foster[ ] a competition for power,”177
which increases accountability to the people across the board. This active,
people-driven balance of power could not exist without state sovereignty.
which the Court fulfills its duty to hear, and resolve, “arising under” cases in accordance
with the Supremacy Clause.
172 See Gerken, supra note 9, at 92.
173 Id. at 111.
174 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy J.,
concurring).
175 See, e.g., NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 552 (1995); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
176 Rakove, supra note 78, at 1042.
177 Garry, supra note 111, at 857.
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Even beyond its role in the effective power dynamic of our federalism,
however, state sovereignty offers a multitude of distinctive virtues. First,
smaller state sovereigns offer more opportunities for political participation
by the citizenry.178 Second, and related to increased political participation,
states have an ability to be more responsive to the unique needs of their
people, which allows people to organize and govern themselves by shared
common values.179 This enhanced self-determination results in more desirable laws for more people than could a unified federal law. Finally, state sovereignty also allows states to function as laboratories of democracy, which
ultimately produces “more innovation and experimentation in
government.”180
Raising the values of federalism here is not meant to be a misplaced and
woefully abbreviated civics lesson. Instead, recounting the values of federalism highlights the important state-sovereignty consequences achieved by an
intentional focus on federal power. The Court has a constitutionally
assigned responsibility to enforce the written bounds of the Constitution, and
thus preserve the federal structure—of which state sovereignty, in its own
right, is an important end. Indeed, “[t]here is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that is more important or that has done more to promote peace, prosperity, and freedom than the federal structure of that great document.”181
CONCLUSION
The Constitution designed one federalism with two safeguards. The
political process offers the people of each state a voice in the congressional
allocation of power between the states and the federal government. However, to ensure the balance struck comports with the parameters of constitutional design, Article III makes it the duty of the judiciary to guarantee that a
challenged product of the political process has its origin in an enumerated
power. No provision of the Constitution makes it the Court’s prerogative, let
alone its duty, to define for the political process the boundary of state sovereignty. Instead, itself a creation of that which it upholds, the Court is
required to hold firmly the lines drawn by the text of the Constitution in
order to preserve and protect a fundamental baseline in the federal balance.
The two safeguards work in tandem to protect our federalism.
Admittedly, the allocation of power in the twenty-first century is different
from anything the framers could have envisioned when crafting the dual safe178 Timothy Zick, Active Sovereignty, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 541, 566 (2007)
(explaining that “sovereignty requires that states, as political communities, provide the
sorts of direct governance opportunities that the federal Constitution omits”).
179 Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1484, 1493–94 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN
(1987)) (explaining that “[state] laws can be adapted to local conditions and local tastes,
while a national government must take a uniform . . . approach”).
180 See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
181 Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 770 (1995).
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guards of federalism. However, it does not follow that their design “can’t
survive in a world where sovereignty is not to be had, where regulatory overlap is the rule.”182 The constitutional limit on federal power may, as a matter
of practical reality, fall in a different place than it once did, but that says
nothing about who is charged with holding that line or how they go about
enforcing it. That judicial function is entrenched in the Constitution. The
Court, by design, is a key player—the last line of defense—in maintaining
our federalism. Logically, the Constitution dictates the rules of the game it
created, and, in doing so, charges the judiciary with the authority to enforce
the limits of constitutionally enumerated powers.

182 Gerken, supra note 9, at 113.

